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Abstract—This paper aims to reduce the communication and
computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy
for the N -coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1].
The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference
graph is introduced to describe the interactions among the
agents in each coalition. 2. The Nash equilibrium seeking
strategy is designed with the interference graphs considered.
The convergence property of the proposed Nash equilibrium
seeking strategy is analytically investigated. It is shown that the
agents’ actions generated by the proposed method converge to
a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium of the graphical N -
coalition noncooperative games under certain conditions. Sev-
eral special cases where there is only one coalition and/or there
are coalitions with only one agent are considered. The results
for the special cases demonstrate that the proposed seeking
strategy achieves the solution seeking for noncooperative games,
social cost minimization problems and single-agent optimization
problems in a unified framework. Numerical examples are
presented to support the theoretical results.
Index Terms—Nash equilibrium seeking; N -coalition nonco-
operative games; interference graph; social cost minimization
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years witnessed great efforts made by the re-
searchers to study distributed optimization problems and
noncooperative games (see e.g., [2]-[18]). Distributed op-
timization captures the cooperative characteristics of net-
worked systems and covers many practical applications
including economic dispatch in the smart grids [4] and
resource allocation problems [5], etc. Noncooperative games,
which catch the competitive nature of self-interested players,
have been widely adopted to analyze electricity markets [2],
transport systems [6], just to name a few. Motivated by the
incentive to model the cooperative and competitive behaviors
in economic markets and adversarial networked systems, an
N -coalition noncooperative game was formulated in [1] to
accommodate the cooperation and competition in a unified
framework. The formulated game concerns with a set of
agents that form N interacting coalitions, each of which is
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composite of a subset of agents that cooperatively minimize
the sum of their local objective functions. Nevertheless, the
coalitions serve as self-interested players in noncooperative
games.
The N -coalition noncooperative games can be utilized
to accommodate many practical circumstances in which
cooperation and competition coexist among the engaged par-
ticipants. For example, in group competitions (e.g., football
games), the participants in the same group cooperate to win
the game while different groups are competitive opponents.
From another aspect, agents in multi-agent environment (e.g.,
transportation networks, cloud computing) may benefit from
forming coalitions to perform tasks especially when single
agent could not complete the task independently or efficiently
[19]. The agents in the same coalition work collaboratively
to serve the tasks while distinct coalitions compete for
the tasks to gain payoffs. Moreover, the formulated N -
coalition noncooperative games have great potential to ad-
dress networked systems in which the agents are subjected to
multiple tasks. For instance, it is promising to achieve multi-
party rendezvous where the agents within each coalition
need to rendezvous to a certain location while preserving
connectivity with the agents in other coalitions. Motivated by
the practical relevance, this paper further investigates the N -
coalition noncooperative games to reduce the communication
and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking
strategy proposed in [1].
To relieve the communication and computation burden,
a new Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is proposed for
the N -coalition noncooperative games. The newly proposed
seeking strategy follows the idea of implementing the gra-
dient play by utilizing consensus protocols to estimate nec-
essary information (see, e.g., [1][2][7]). Consensus proto-
cols were utilized as supportive tools to solve social cost
minimization problems and noncooperative games in several
recent works including [1][2][7]-[10] and some other refer-
ences therein. In [8], the DIGing algorithm was proposed
through imitating the distributed gradient descent via a
gradient tracking recursion. A leader-following consensus
protocol was leveraged to disseminate local information
in [7] and [10] for noncooperative games and distributed
optimization problems, respectively. A dynamic average
consensus protocol was included in an extremum seeking
scheme in [9], [2] and [1] for collaborative optimization,
Nash equilibrium seeking for aggregative games and the
N -coalition noncooperative games, respectively. However,
in [1], it assumed that the agents’ objective functions are
functions of all the agents’ actions, which might possibly
result in redundant communication and computation costs if
the agents’ objective functions depend on only a subset of
the agents’ actions.
Game theoretic models for wireless communication net-
works and multi-agent systems involve typical examples in
which the players’ payoff functions are more closely related
with the actions’ of the players who are their physical
neighbors (see e.g., [22]-[26] and the references therein).
Considering the spatial reuse and the heterogeneous resource
competition capabilities among the secondary users in the
wireless communication networks, the asymmetric interfer-
ence among the users was addressed in [22], which gener-
alized the symmetric interference in the atomic congestion
games in [24]. In the sensor deployment game designed in
[26], the local utilities for each node depended on the actions
of their in-neighbors only. To describe the interactions among
the agents, an interference graph was introduced [13] [22]-
[25]. The authors in [22] adopted a directed graph for the
spatial spectrum access games and similar idea was utilized
in [24] to describe the interactions among the players in
the atomic congestion games. In this regard, the N -coalition
game considered in [1] can be treated as a game in which the
interference graphs for the coalitions are complete graphs.
To further remove the redundant estimation variables in
the strategy design, we introduce an interference graph to
each coalition and design an interference graph based Nash
equilibrium seeking strategy, by which the communication
and computation costs are further reduced if the interference
graphs are not complete graphs.
In summary, with some preliminary results in [25], the
main contributions of the paper are listed as follows.
1) A new Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is proposed
for the N -coalition noncooperative games by introduc-
ing an interference graph to each coalition to describe
the interactions among the agents in each coalition.
Compared with the seeking strategy in [1], the new
strategy requires less communication and computation
costs, especially for N -coalition noncooperative games
on sparse interference graphs. Moreover, different from
the seeking strategy in [1] which only addresses the
case in which N ≥ 2,mi ≥ 2, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi},
the proposed seeking strategy can also accommodate
the cases in which N = 1 and/or mi = 1. This
indicates that the proposed method solves the single-
agent minimization, social cost minimization and non-
cooperative games in a unified framework.
2) The convergence results are analytically studied by
Lyapunov stability analysis. It is shown that under
certain conditions, the agents’ actions converge to
a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium of the N -
coalition noncooperative games for N ≥ 2, and to
a neighborhood of the solution of the corresponding
minimization problem for N = 1.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we revisit the N -coalition noncooperative
game formulated in [1]. In this game, there are N interacting
coalitions (N is an integer andN ≥ 1) that are self-interested
to minimize their own cost functions. The cost function of
coalition i, denoted as fi(xi,x−i), is defined as
fi(xi,x−i) =
∑mi
j=1
fij(xi,x−i), ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N},
(1)
in which mi ≥ 1 is an integer that denotes the
number of agents in coalition i and fij(xi,x−i)
is a function available to agent j in coalition
i only. Furthermore, xi = [xi1, xi2, · · · , ximi ]
T ,
x−i = [x
T
1 ,x
T
2 , · · · ,x
T
i−1,x
T
i+1, · · · ,x
T
N ]
T , x =
[xT1 ,x
T
2 , · · · ,x
T
N ]
T , where xij ∈ R is the action of
agent j in coalition i that is governed by agent j in coalition
i. Hence, in the N -coalition noncooperative game, the
agents within the same coalition collaborate to minimize the
sum of their local functions, while constituting a coalition
that acts as a player in a noncooperative game. The agents in
coalition i are equipped with a communication network with
graph topology GiC , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. This paper intends
to develop a new Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the
agents to reduce the communication and computation costs
of the strategy proposed in [1] under the condition that the
Nash equilibrium of the N -coalition game x∗ exists and is
finite. Note that without any further clarification, if N = 1,
the objective is solution seeking for the corresponding
minimization problem given that the solution exists and is
finite. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium considered in this
paper is pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
The Nash equilibrium of the N -coalition noncooperative
game (for N > 1) is defined as follows.
Definition 1: Nash equilibrium is an action profile on
which no player can reduce its own cost by unilaterally
changing its own action, i.e., x∗ = (x∗i ,x
∗
−i) is a Nash
equilibrium of the N -coalition noncooperative games if for
xi ∈ Rmi ,
fi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ fi(xi,x
∗
−i), ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. (2)
Remark 1: Note that by regarding each coalition as a
player in a noncooperative game, the conditions that ensure
the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium follow
the existing explorations in [11][18][28]-[30].
The rest of the paper is based on the following assump-
tions.
Assumption 1: The agents’ objective functions
fij(xi,x−i), for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi}
are C2 functions.
Assumption 2: For all distinct x,y ∈ R
∑N
i=1
mi
(x− y)T (P(x)− P(y)) > 0, (3)
where P(x) = [(∂f1(x)
∂x1
)T , (∂f2(x)
∂x2
)T , · · · , (∂fN (x)
∂xN
)T ]T .
Remark 2: Assumption 2, adapted from [7] [11]-[13],
assumes that the pseudo-gradient vector P(x) is strictly
monotone. Note that this assumption weakens the strong
monotonicity assumption (i.e., (x − y)T (P(x) − P(y)) ≥
l||x − y||2, for some positive constant l) in [1]. Moreover,
when N = 1, the strict (strong) monotonicity is reduced
to strict (strong) convexity of the corresponding function.
Detailed explanations on monotonicity are available in [31]
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Fig. 1: Network illustration and the interference graph for
the agents(users) in coalition 1 of the game in Example 1.
and readers are referred to Chapter 2 of [31] for more
elaborations.
III. N -COALITION NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES ON
INTERFERENCE GRAPHS
In this section, a new Nash equilibrium seeking strategy
will be proposed. Convergence results for the case in which
N ≥ 2,mi ≥ 2, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} will be firstly inves-
tigated followed by several special cases in which N = 1
and/or mi = 1 for some i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
Before we proceed to the Nash equilibrium seeking strat-
egy design, we firstly introduce an interference graph (see
e.g., [13] [24]) to each coalition to describe the interactions
among the agents in the same coalition. Suppose that agent j
is a neighbor of agent k in the interference graph of coalition
i (denoted as GiI ) if and only if fij explicitly depends on xik
or alternatively fik explicitly depends on xij [25]. Then,
∂fi(x)
∂xik
=
mi∑
j=1
∂fij(x)
∂xik
=
∑
j∈(N i
Ik
∪{k})
∂fij(x)
∂xik
, (4)
whereN iIk denotes the neighboring set of agent k in coalition
i in the interference graph GiI .
Example 1: Consider an N -coalition network game in
Ad Hoc wireless communication networks. In the game,
each agent j in coalition i intends to send its data flow
xij from the source node sij to the destination node dij .
Suppose that coalition 1 of the N -coalition noncoopera-
tive game contains agents 1-4, whose associated network
is depicted in Fig. 1(a) (note that the agents in other
coalitions are not depicted in the figure). Then, by the
congestion control model in [32], the cost functions for
the 4 agents are f11(x11, x12, x14,x−1), f12(x11, x12, x13,
x14,x−1), f13(x12, x13,x−1) and f14(x11, x12, x14,x−1),
respectively. In this example, the interference graph for
coalition 1 can be depicted as in Fig. 1(b). In addition,
∂f1(x)
∂x11
= ∂f11(x)
∂x11
+ ∂f12(x)
∂x11
+ ∂f14(x)
∂x11
, ∂f1(x)
∂x12
= ∂f11(x)
∂x12
+
∂f12(x)
∂x12
+ ∂f13(x)
∂x12
+ ∂f14(x)
∂x12
, ∂f1(x)
∂x13
= ∂f12(x)
∂x13
+ ∂f13(x)
∂x13
,
∂f1(x)
∂x14
= ∂f11(x)
∂x14
+ ∂f12(x)
∂x14
+ ∂f14(x)
∂x14
, which are in line with
(4).
Remark 3: Equation (4) is inspired by practical engineer-
ing systems in which the agents’ costs are more closely cor-
related with their physical neighbors (see e.g., [22][24][32]).
By introducing the interference graph to capture the player-
specific cost functions in such games, we intend to propose
a Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the N -coalition
noncooperative games with the interactions among the agents
taken into account.
A. Nash equilibrium seeking strategy design
To search for the Nash equilibrium of the N -coalition
noncooperative games, agent j in coalition i updates its
action according to
x˙ij(t) = −dijgijj(t), (5)
for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi} where dij =
δd¯ij , δ is a small positive parameter to be determined and
d¯ij is a fixed positive parameter. Moreover, for each i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi}, k ∈ (N
i
Ij ∪ {j}), gijk is
generated by
w˙ijk(t) = −
∑
l∈(N i
Ik
∪{k})
ajli (gijk(t)− gilk(t))
gijk(t) = wijk(t) +
∂fij(x(t))
∂xik
,
(6)
where ajli is the element on the jth row and lth column
of the adjacency matrix of GiC . In addition, wijk for i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi}, k ∈ (N iIj ∪ {j}) are
auxiliary variables initialized at wijk(0) = 0 (without loss of
generality, the initial time instant is supposed to be 0). Note
that in the subsequent analysis, the time-variable t might be
omitted for notational convenience.
Remark 4: The design of the Nash equilibrium seeking
strategy for the N -coalition noncooperative game in (5)-(6)
follows the ideas in [1][7] to adapt the consensus protocols
in [21] (i.e., (6) in the proposed method) to estimate the
required information based on which the gradient play is
indirectly implemented (i.e., (5) in the proposed method). To
be more specific, gijj provides an estimate of
1
(Ni
Ij
+1)
∂fi(x)
∂xij
,
where N iIj denotes the number of agents in N
i
Ij , by uti-
lizing the physical-interaction-based consensus protocol in
(6). Moreover, (5) implements the gradient play by utilizing
the agents’ local estimates on the corresponding gradient
values. However, it’s worth noting that in (5)-(6), agent j in
coalition i only generates 2(N iIj+1) auxiliary variables (i.e.,
gijk ,wijk, k ∈ (N iIj ∪ {j})). Moreover, agent j in coalition
i only communicates gijk for k ∈ (N iIj ∪ {j}) with the
agents who are in N iIk ∪ {k} and are its neighbors in G
i
C .
In contrast, in [1], agent j in coalition i needs to generate
2mi auxiliary variables and communicate all the auxiliary
variables with its neighbors in the communication graph
GiC . Hence, when the interference graphs are sparse graphs,
N iIj + 1 is much smaller compared to mi and the method
in (5)-(6) gives much lower computation and communication
costs compared with the method in [1]. Furthermore, even
if the interference graphs are complete graphs (N iIj + 1 =
mi), i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi}, agent j in
coalition i only communicates with its neighbors in GiC on
gijk but not on wijk, where k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi}, which is
also required in [1].
B. Convergence analysis
In the following, we firstly provide the analysis for the
case in which N ≥ 2,mi ≥ 2, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. Then, the
special cases where mi = 1 and/or N = 1 will be discussed.
Case I (N ≥ 2,mi ≥ 2, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}): For
each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi}, remove from
GiC the nodes that are not the neighbors of agent k in
coalition i in the interference graph GiI except for agent
k. Leave the remaining nodes and the edges therein [25].
Denote the new graph as GiCk , named as interference-to-k
communication graph for coalition i, and its corresponding
Laplacian matrix as LiCk .Moreover, defineWik/Gik/F¯ik(x)
as the concatenated vectors of wijk/gijk/
∂fij(x)
∂xik
over j ∈
(N iIk ∪ {k}), respectively. Then, (6) can be written as
W˙ik = −L
i
Ck
Gik, Gik = Wik + F¯ik(x). (7)
Let 1M (0M ) be anM -dimensional column vector composite
of 1(0) and define NCi
k
as the number of agents in GiCk .
Motivated by [2], let Rik ∈ R
N
Ci
k×R
N
Ci
k
−1
be a matrix such
that Uik =
[
1N
Ci
k√
N
Ci
k
Rik
]
∈ R
N
Ci
k ×R
N
Ci
k is an orthogonal
matrix. Note that
[
1N
Ci
k√
N
Ci
k
Rik
]
stands for a matrix whose
first column is
1N
Ci
k√
N
Ci
k
and the remaining columns are equal
to those in Rik. In addition, define [Gik G¯
T
ik]
T = UTikGik,
[W ik W¯
T
ik]
T = UTikWik, where Gik,W ik ∈ R and
G¯ik, W¯ik ∈ R
N
Ci
k
−1
.
Then, given that GiCk is undirected and connected,
W˙ ik = 0,
˙¯Wik = −R
T
ikL
i
Ck
RikG¯ik, (8)
by which W ik(t) = W ik(0) = 0, and R
T
ikL
i
Ck
Rik is
symmetric positive definite.
Since Gik = Wik + F¯ik(x),
Gik = W ik+
1TN
Ci
k√
NCi
k
F¯ik(x), G¯ik = W¯ik+R
T
ikF¯ik(x), (9)
i.e., Gik(t) = W ik(t) +
1√
N
Ci
k
∑
j∈(N i
Ik
∪{k})
∂fij(x)
∂xik
=
1√
N
Ci
k
∑mi
j=1
∂fij(x)
∂xik
by (4), given that GiCk is undirected and
connected. In addition,
˙¯Gik = −R
T
ikL
i
Ck
RikG¯ik +R
T
ik
˙¯Fik(x). (10)
Lemma 1: For x ∈ R
∑N
i=1
mi , there exists a positive
constant βijk such that∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣gijk − 1NCi
k
mi∑
l=1
∂fil(x)
∂xik
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ βijk||G¯ik||, (11)
for each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi}, j ∈
(N iIk ∪ {k}) given that for each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, k ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,mi}, GiCk is undirected and connected.
Proof: See Section VI-B for the proof. 
Let G¯ = [G¯T11, G¯
T
12, · · · , G¯
T
1m1 , G¯
T
21, · · · , G¯
T
2m2 , · · · ,
G¯TNmN ]
T . Define χ(t) = [G¯T (t), (x(t)− x∗)T ]T . Then, the
following result can be derived.
Theorem 1: Suppose that for each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, k ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,mi}, the interference graph GiI and the
interference-to-k communication graphs GiCk are undirected
and connected. Then, for each pair of positive constants
(∆, v), there is a positive constant δ∗(∆, v) such that for
each δ ∈ (0, δ∗), χ(t) generated by (5)-(6) satisfies
||χ(t)|| ≤ φ(||χ(0)||, δt) + v (12)
where φ(·, ·) ∈ KL and ||χ(0)|| < ∆, given that Assump-
tions 1-2 hold.
Proof: See Section VI-C for the proof. 
Case II (N ≥ 2,mj = 1 for some j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}):
For notational convenience, we suppose that mi > 1, ∀i 6= j,
which can be easily extended to the case in which there are
multiple coalitions with only one agent. In this case, the
seeking strategy in (5)-(6) for the agent in coalition j is
reduced to
x˙j1 = −dj1gj11, w˙j11 = 0, gj11 = wj11 +
∂fj1(x)
∂xj1
, (13)
where wj11(0) = 0, dj1 = δd¯j1.
Hence, (13) is equivalent to
x˙j1 = −dj1
∂fj1(x)
∂xj1
. (14)
Define G¯−j as the concatenated vector of G¯ik for i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}, i 6= j, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi} and χ−j(t) =
[G¯T−j(t), (x(t) − x
∗)T ]T . Then, the following result can be
derived.
Corollary 1: Suppose that for each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, i 6=
j, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi}, the interference graph GiI and the
interference-to-k communication graphs GiCk are undirected
and connected. Then, for each pair of positive constants
(∆, v), there exists a positive constant δ∗(∆, v) such that
for each δ ∈ (0, δ∗), χ−j(t) generated by (5)-(6) satisfies
||χ−j(t)|| ≤ φ(||χ−j(0)||, δt) + v, (15)
where φ(·, ·) ∈ KL and ||χ−j(0)|| < ∆, given that Assump-
tions 1-2 hold.
Proof: See Section VI-D for the proof. 
In addition, if mi = 1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} and N ≥ 2,
the considered N -coalition noncooperative game is reduced
to a noncooperative game in which there exist N players
and the cost function of player i is fi1(x). Moreover, the
proposed seeking strategy in (5)-(6) is reduced to
x˙i1 = −di1
∂fi1(x)
∂xi1
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, (16)
by which it can be derived that the Nash equilibrium of the
noncooperative game is globally asymptotically stable given
that Assumptions 1-2 hold.
Case III (N = 1,m1 ≥ 2): In this case, there is only
one coalition and there are multiple agents therein. The
formulated N -coalition game is reduced to a social cost
minimization problem, i.e.,
minx1 f1(x1) =
∑m1
j=1
f1j(x1). (17)
Moreover, the seeking strategy in (5)-(6) is reduced to
x˙1j = −d1jg1jj
w˙1jk = −
∑
l∈(N 1
Ik
∪{k})
ajl1 (g1jk − g1lk)
g1jk = w1jk +
∂f1j(x1)
∂x1k
,
(18)
in which d1j = δd¯1j , w1jk(0) = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m1}, k ∈
(N 1Ij ∪ {j}). Define χ1(t) = [G¯
T
1 (t), (x1(t) − x
∗
1)
T ]T ,
where x∗1 is the solution to the problem in (17) and G¯1 =
[G¯T11, G¯
T
12, · · · , G¯
T
1m1 ]
T . Then, following the analysis of
Theorem 1, the subsequent corollary can be obtained.
Corollary 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1-2 hold, G1I and
G1Ck , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m1} are undirected and connected.
Then, for each pair of positive constants (∆, v), there exists
a positive constant δ∗(∆, v) such that for each δ ∈ (0, δ∗),
χ1(t) generated by (18) satisfies
||χ1(t)|| ≤ φ(||χ1(0)||, δt) + v, (19)
where φ(·, ·) ∈ KL and ||χ1(0)|| < ∆, given that Assump-
tions 1-2 hold.
Remark 5: In this case, Assumption 2 is reduced to the
condition that f1(x1) is strictly convex and Corollary 2
indicates that social cost minimization can be achieved
without convexity conditions on the local objective functions.
Case IV (N = 1,m1 = 1): In this case, the formulated
N -coalition game is reduced to a single-agent minimization
problem, i.e.,
minx11 f11(x11), (20)
and the proposed seeking strategy is reduced to
x˙11 = −d11
∂f11(x11)
∂x11
, (21)
by which it can be derived that x∗11, which stands for the
solution to the problem in (20), is globally asymptotically
stable under (21) given that Assumptions 1-2 hold.
Remark 6: The above results indicate that the considered
N -coalition noncooperative game covers the social cost
minimization, noncooperative games and single-agent opti-
mization as special cases. Moreover, the proposed seeking
strategy solves the aforementioned problems in a unified
framework.
Remark 7: In the above results, we suppose that for
each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi}, G
i
Ck
is undi-
rected and connected. When the interference graphs are
complete graphs, this condition is reduced to GiC for each
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} being undirected and connected. With
the interference graphs, the connectivity of GiCk for i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi} is utilized to ensure that
the agents can disseminate necessary information to the other
related agents. The following condition, adopted from [13],
is utilized to ensure that GiCk for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, k ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,mi} are connected.
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Fig. 2: Network illustration for Example 2.
Assumption 3: [13] The interference graphs GiI and the
communication graphs GiC for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} are
undirected and connected. Moreover, Gim ⊆ G
i
C ⊆ G
i
I , ∀i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}, where Gim denotes the maximal triangle-free
spanning subgraph of GiI .
Then, following the analysis in [13], the following result
can be derived.
Lemma 2: Suppose that Assumption 3 is satisfied. Then,
for each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi}, the graph
GiCk is undirected and connected.
Remark 8: In the above results, we suppose that the inter-
ference graphs for all the coalitions with more than one agent
are connected. However, if there is an interference graph GjI
for some j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} that is not connected, then, the
coalition can be separated into several coalitions (possibly
into several independent agents), each with a connected
interference graph. For more detailed elaborations on the
interference graphs, the reader are referred to [25].
Remark 9: Note that with strong monotonicity of the
pseudo-gradient vector, it can be shown that similar to the
results in [1], the proposed method enables the agents’
actions to converge exponentially to the Nash equilibrium
under certain conditions.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, N -coalition noncooperative games with
N = 3,m1 = 1,m2 = 3,m3 = 6 are considered. Firstly, a
congestion control game in Ad Hoc wireless communication
networks is considered in Example 2. Then, a game that
violates Assumption 2 is simulated in Example 3.
Example 2: Consider an Ad Hoc wireless communication
network that consists of several nodes as depicted in Fig. 2.
Suppose that in the network, agent j in coalition i intends
to transmit nonnegative data flow xij from sij to dij . Then,
the cost function of agent j in coalition i can be captured
by [32]
fij(x) =
∑
l∈Pˆij
κ
Cl −
∑
l xij
− uij log(xij + 1), (22)
where Cl is the capacity of link l, κ, uij are agent-specified
parameters, Pˆij denotes the path of agent j in coalition i,
and
∑
l xij denotes the total flow on link l, l ∈ Pˆij . See [32]
for the details on the model formulation of the congestion
control game.
In the simulation, we suppose that all the
link capacities are 20 and κ = 10, uij = 10.
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Fig. 3: The interference graphs for coalitions 2 and 3. (a) is
the interference graph for the agents in coalition 2 and (b)
is the interference graph for the agents in coalition 3.
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Fig. 4: The communication graphs for the agents in coalitions
2 and 3. (a) is the communication graph for the agents in
coalition 2 and (b) is the communication graph for the agents
in coalition 3.
By direct calculation, it can be derived that the
game admits a unique Nash equilibrium x∗ =
[12.63, 5.58, 3.68, 6.12, 5.16, 2.03, 2.03, 10.16, 10.16, 5.63]T.
The interference graph and the communication graph for
the game are given in Figs. 3-4, respectively. Correspond-
ingly, G3Ck for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 6} are given in Fig. 5. It can be
seen that in line with Lemma 2, G3Ck for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 6}
are undirected and connected. Initialized at xij(0) = 0.5
(all the other variables are initialized at zero), the players’
actions generated by the proposed method in (5)-(6) are
given in Fig. 6. The simulation result shows that the agents’
actions generated by the proposed seeking strategy in (5)-(6)
converge to the actual Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, different from [1], by designing the strategy
based on the interference graphs in coalition 3, agent 1 does
not need to generate g314, w314, g315, w315; agent 4 does not
need to generate g341, w341, g345, w345, g346, w346; agent 5
does not need to generate g351, w351, g354, w354, g356, w356
and agent 6 does not need to generate g364, w364, g365, w365
in the seeking strategy, thus requiring less computation. In
addition, from the communication graph for the agents in
2 3
4 5 6
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1
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4 5 6
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1
2 5 3
(d) (e) (f)
12
36
31
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Fig. 5: The graphs G3Ck for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 6} are given in
(a)-(f), respectively.
Fig. 6: The agents’ actions generated by the proposed method
in (5)-(6) in Example 2.
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Fig. 7: The agents’ actions generated by the proposed method
in (5)-(6) in Example 3.
coalition 3, it can be seen that if the method in [1] is adopted,
agent 1 in coalition 3 needs to communicate with agents 2
and 3 in coalition 3 on g31k, w31k; agent 2 in coalition 3
needs to communicate with agents 1, 4, 5, 6 in coalition 3 on
g32k, w32k; agent 3 in coalition 3 needs to communicate with
agents 1, 4, 5, 6 in coalition 3 on g33k, w33k; agents 4, 5, 6
in coalition 3 need to communicate with agents 2 and 3
on g34k, w34k , g35k, w35k and g36k, w36k , k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 6},
respectively. In contrast, by utilizing the proposed method,
agent 1 in coalition 3 communicates with agents 2, 3 in
coalition 3 on g31k, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 6}; agents 2, 3 in coalition
3 communicates with agents 1, 4, 5, 6 on g32k, g33k, k ∈
{1, 2, · · · , 6}, respectively; agents 4, 5, 6 in coalition 3 com-
municate with agents 2, 3 on g34k, k ∈ {2, 3, 4}, g35k, k ∈
{2, 3, 5}, g36k, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 6}, respectively. Through direct
comparison, it can be seen that by utilizing the proposed
method, the communication and computation costs are sig-
nificantly reduced compared with the method in [1].
Example 3: (A game without strictly monotone pseudo-
gradients) In this example, we consider a game in which the
agents’ objective functions are defined as f11(x) = (x11 −
1
2x31)
2, f21 = x
3
21 + 2x
2
21 + x
2
22 − x21x32 − x21x23, f22 =
−2x21x22 + x21x23, f23 = −x321 + x
2
23 − x21x11 + x21x22,
f31 = −ex31 + x231 − x31x
2
21, f32 = −x32
∑6
j=1 x3j , f33 =
x232 + x
2
33 + x32
∑6
j=1 x3j −
∑2
i=1
∑mi
j=1 xij , f34 = x
2
34,
f35 = x
2
35, and f36 = e
x31 + x236, respectively. In this case,
letting P(x) = 010 gives two points on which x = 010 or
x = [49, 14, 7, 0, 98, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]T, by which it can be easily
derived that Assumption 2 is violated.
With the agents’ actions initialized at x(0) =
[4, 1.6,−1.2,−0.8, 0, 0.4, 1, 1.4, 1.8, 4]T (all the other vari-
ables are initialized at zero), the agents’ actions generated
by the proposed method are depicted in Fig. 7. Note that the
communication graphs and the interference graphs adopted
in the simulation are the same as those in Example 2. From
the simulation result, we can see that the agents’ actions
generated by the proposed method converge to 010 under
the given initial conditions, which is a Nash equilibrium
point of the game, though Assumption 2 is not satisfied.
Actually, similar to [1], local convergence to each Nash
equilibrium that satisfies certain conditions (see Assumptions
3-4 in [1]) can be derived for the proposed seeking strategy.
The analytical study is not provided due to space limitation.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the N -coalition noncooperative
games formulated in [1]. To reduce the computation and
communication costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strat-
egy proposed in [1], a new seeking strategy is proposed
by introducing an interference graph to each coalition to
describe the interactions among the agents. A sufficient
condition on the interference graph and the communication
graph is provided to ensure the convergence of the proposed
seeking strategy. It is shown that under certain conditions, the
agents’ actions generated by the proposed methods converge
to a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium of the N -coalition
noncooperative games. In addition, several special cases,
where there is only one coalition and/or there are coalitions
with only one agent, are studied. The associated convergence
results demonstrate that the proposed method solves the
noncooperative games, the social cost minimization problems
and the single-agent optimization problems in a unified
framework.
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VI. APPENDIX
A. Preliminaries
A graph is defined as G = (V , E) where V =
{1, 2, · · · ,M} is the set of nodes in the network and E
denotes the set of edges. The elements of E are denoted
as (i, j), which represents for an edge from i to j. Associate
with each edge (j, i) ∈ E a weight aij > 0. Note that we
suppose that the graph is simple, i.e., aii = 0. The graph is
undirected if aij = aji, ∀i, j ∈ V . The adjacency matrix A
of graph G is a matrix with its element on the ith row and
jth column defined as aij > 0 if (j, i) ∈ E , else, aij = 0. An
undirected graph is connected if there exists a path between
any pair of distinct vertices. The neighboring set of agent i
is defined as Ni = {j ∈ V|(j, i) ∈ E}. The Laplacian matrix
L is defined as L = D − A, where D is a diagonal matrix
whose ith diagonal element is equal to
∑M
j=1 aij .
A subgraph HG of a graph G is a graph whose sets of
vertices and edges are subsets of the vertex set and edge set
of G, respectively. Alternatively, G is the supergraph of HG .
A subgraph HG is a spanning subgraph of G if it contains
all the vertices of G. In addition, a triangle-free subgraph
HG of a graph G is a subgraph in which no three vertices
form a triangle of edges. Graph HG is a maximal triangle-
free subgraph of G if adding a missing edge to HG forms a
triangle [13][20].
B. Proof of Lemma 1
For notational convenience, given that gijk is the lth
element in Gik , we use [RikG¯ik]l to denote the lth element
in RikG¯ik. Since Gik =
[
1N
Ci
k√
N
Ci
k
Rik
]
[Gik, (G¯ik)
T ]T =
1N
Ci
k
(
1
N
Ci
k
∑mi
j=1
∂fij(x)
∂xik
)
+ RikG¯ik, it can
be derived that
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣gijk − 1N
Ci
k
∑mi
l=1
∂fil(x)
∂xik
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ 1N
Ci
k
∑mi
l=1
∂fil(x)
∂xik
+ [RikG¯ik]l −
1
N
Ci
k
∑mi
l=1
∂fil(x)
∂xik
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∣[RikG¯ik]l∣∣∣∣ ≤ βijk||G¯ik||, where βijk is a positive
constant such that ||[RikG¯ik]l|| ≤ βijk ||G¯ik||.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Inspired by [1][7] and [27], define the Lyapunov
candidate function as V =
∑N
i=1
∑mi
k=1 G¯
T
ikPikG¯ik +
1
2 (x − x
∗)T
(
diag{ d¯ij
N
Ci
j
}
)−1
(x − x∗), where Pik
is a symmetric positive definite matrix such that
PikR
T
ikL
i
Ck
Rik + R
T
ikL
i
Ck
RikPik = Qik, Qik is a
symmetric positive definite matrix. Moreover, the notation
diag{hij} for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi}
is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are
h11, h12, · · · , h1m1 , h21, · · · , hNmN , successively.
Define λmin(Qik) as the minimum eigenvalue of Qik,
and λ = min{λmin(Qik), i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, k ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,mi}}. Then, the time derivative of the Lyapunov
candidate function satisfies
V˙ ≤ −λ||G¯||2 − δ(x− x∗)TP(x)
+ δ(x− x∗)T
(
P(x)− col{NCi
j
gijj}
)
− 2δ
N∑
i=1
mi∑
k=1
G¯TikPikR
T
ik
(
∂F¯ik(x)
∂x
)T
col{d¯ijgijj},
(23)
where col{hij} for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, j ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,mi} is defined as col{hij} =
[h11, h12, · · · , h1m1 , h21, · · · , hNmN ]
T . Note that the
above inequality is derived by utilizing the fact
that (x − x∗)T col{NCi
j
gijj} = (x − x∗)T (P(x) −
P(x) + col{NCi
j
gijj}) and
˙¯Fik =
(
∂F¯ik(x)
∂x
)T
x˙ =
−δ
(
∂F¯ik(x)
∂x
)T
col{d¯ijgijj}.
By Lemma 1, it can be derived that for x ∈
R
∑N
i=1
mi , there is a positive constant β such that∣∣∣∣∣∣P(x)− col{NCi
j
gijj}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ β||G¯||. In addition, as fij(x)
for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,mi} are C
2 functions,
||∂F¯ik(x)
∂x
|| is bounded for x that belongs to a compact set.
From another aspect, by Assumption 2, P(x∗) = 0, as
xij ∈ R in this paper. Hence, there are positive constants
β1, β2 such that ||col{NCijgijj}|| = ||col{NCijgijj}−P(x)+
P(x)−P(x∗)|| ≤ β1||G¯||+ β2||x−x
∗|| for x that belongs
to a compact set.
Since (x − x∗)TP(x) = (x − x∗)T (P(x) − P(x∗)) > 0
for all x 6= x∗, there exists a function ϕ(||x − x∗||) ∈ K
such that (x − x∗)TP(x) ≥ ϕ(||x − x∗||) by Assumption
2. Therefore, for any χ = [G¯T , (x− x∗)T ]T that belongs to
a compact set Ω that contains the origin, there are positive
constants γ1, γ2 such that
V˙ ≤− λ||G¯||2 − δϕ(||x− x∗||) + δβ||x− x∗||||G¯||
+ δ||G¯||(γ1||G¯||+ γ2||x− x
∗||)
≤−
(
λ− δγ1 −
δ(β + γ2)
2γ3
)
||G¯||2 − δϕ(||x− x∗||)
+ δ(β + γ2)γ3||x− x
∗||2/2,
(24)
where γ3 is a positive constant that can be arbitrarily chosen.
Suppose that λ− δγ1 −
δ(β+γ
2
)
2γ
3
> δ. Then,
V˙ ≤−
δ
2
(||G¯||2 + ϕ(||x− x∗||))−
δ
2
(||G¯||2 + ϕ(||x − x∗||))
+ δ(β + γ2)γ3||x− x
∗||2/2 ≤ −δϕ1(||χ||)/2,
(25)
for all ϕ1(||χ||) ≥ (β+γ2)γ3̺, where ̺ is a positive constant
such that ||x − x∗||2 ≤ ̺ for χ ∈ Ω and ϕ1 ∈ K satisfies
||G¯||2 + ϕ(||x− x∗||) ≥ ϕ1(||χ||).
For χ ∈ Ω, choose γ3 such that (β+γ2)γ3̺ is sufficiently
small. Then, fixed γ3, let δ
∗ = 2λγ32γ
3
+β+γ
2
+2γ
1
γ
3
.
Then, for each δ ∈ (0, δ∗)
V˙ ≤ −
δ
2
ϕ1(||χ||), ∀||χ|| ≥ ϕ
−1
1 ((β + γ2)γ3̺). (26)
By further noticing that there are positive constants c1 are
c2 such that c1||χ||
2 ≤ V ≤ c2||χ||
2, the conclusion can be
derived by following the proof of Theorem 4.18 in [27].
D. Proof of Corollary 1
The result can be proven by defining the Lyapunov candi-
date function as V =
∑N
i=1,i6=j
∑mi
k=1 G¯
T
ikPikG¯ik +
1
2 (x −
x∗)T
(
diag
{
d¯il
N
Ci
l
})−1
(x − x∗). The rest of the proof is
similar to that of Theorem 1, and is omitted here.
